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SUBJECT: NPT PREPCOM CHAIR CONSULTS IN VIENNA

Summary

¶1. (SBU) Rounding out consultations in New York and Geneva, NPT Prepcom Chairman Zimbabwe UN Permrep Bonafoice Chidyausiku reviewed preparations for the 2009 Prepcom with approximately two dozen states parties in Vienna March 16. The first priority for the Prepcom would be to adopt the 2010 Revcom agenda, he stressed, and secondarily to make recommendations to the Revcon that should reflect balance among the three NPT pillars. He indicated support for using the "clean" 2000 Revcom agenda as a starting point, but also considered other views so long as the end result was a balanced agenda. He downplayed any expectation of substantive negotiations at the Prepcom, arguing that it would be particularly unfair to the new U.S. administration. Chidyausiku cast his role as that of a facilitator and enjoined states parties to "get their act together," as success was in their hands. During the discussion, Egypt took a forceful position that the Prepcom should deal with substantive objectives and not defer them to the Revcon. Germany and Chile recommended that once the Revcon agenda was agreed, the Chair propose a more ambitious outline or "scenario" to set the stage for the Revcon and to help forestall another debacle as in 2005. End Summary.

¶2. (SBU) Prepcom Chairman Chidyausiku met with Vienna Missions, having already held consultations in New York and Geneva. He underlined that the first priority for the Prepcom was agreement on the 2010 Revcon agenda, so as to avoid a repeat of the 2005 agenda fight. Drawing on the lessons from the 2005 Revcon, Brazil also stressed adoption of the agenda to ensure the Revcon's success. The ROK questioned whether the 2000 or 2005 Revcon agenda could serve as the basis for 2010, having heard from Geneva that there was support for using the 2000 agenda as a compromise. Chidyausiku noted that the 2000 agenda was "cleaner" than that of 2005. Agreeing that the agenda should be the priority, Japan suggested using the 2007 Prepcom (which Japan had chaired) agenda as it struck an appropriate balance. Chidyausiku acknowledged views about using the 2007 agenda but also reservations on the part of those who preferred to work from the 2000 agenda. He promised to take all views into consideration in formulating a balanced agenda.

¶3. (SBU) Secondarily, Chidyausiku addressed the issue of making recommendations to the Revcon. He did not believe it would be productive or fair to start substantive negotiations at the May Prepcom, given that the new U.S. Administration is hardly in place, and there was ample time before the 2010 Revcon. However, the Prepcom should produce more than Chair's "summaries upon summaries." The Chair would put together recommendations for the Revcon based on input from states parties, though he had not received much input thus far. Chidyausiku noted that some held the view that agreement on the Revcon agenda would be enough and that putting forward substantive recommendations would be stepping into a "minefield," while others had suggested enumerating recommendations as bullet

points or "intentions." During the Q&A the ROK advised that it may not be realistic to contemplate consensus on substantive recommendations. Chidyausiku reiterated that he would draw on input received from states parties and suggested any recommendations not be too detailed.

¶ 14. (SBU) Egypt took a strong stance on the importance of the Prepcom setting forth substantive objectives for the Revcon. Egypt did not support deferral of substantive issues to the Revcon for the sake of quick consensus at the Prepcom, arguing that these issues should be highlighted at the conclusion of the Prepcom. Many saw the comments by Egyptian Ambassador Fawzi foreshadowing a tough line on Middle East Safeguards and other issues at the upcoming IAEA General Conference. Chidyausiku acknowledged that the role of the Prepcom was to prepare for the Revcon and that substantive issues are discussed in all three Prepcoms. However, it was a question of timing and what we hoped to achieve; agreement on substance was unrealistic given the political environment as the U.S. would not be ready, and there was more time and opportunity at the Revcon. He argued that it would "serve the treaty better" if states parties agree to an agenda and reaffirm the substance of 2000 and 2005 Revcons so as to set the stage for a more conducive Revcon in 2010.

¶ 15. (SBU) Although acknowledging the precedence of agreement on the Revcon agenda, Germany underlined the crucial importance of setting the stage for the Revcon so as to avert another failure as in 2005 and encouraged the Chair to be as ambitious as possible in this regard. Specifically, Germany looked to the Chair for guidance on outlining possible results for the Revcon, hoping that "new deal" could lead to a balanced outcome, and recommended that Chidyausiku propose more ambitious elements for the Revcon in lieu of another Chair's summary. Chidyausiku reiterated that procedural issues must be dealt with first, but if we could go further he did not rule out making recommendations to the Revcon. The Chilean Director for International Organizations, who was visiting Vienna and had participated in the 2005 Revcon, agreed with Germany that a well-prepared scenario for the 2010 Revcon would be desirable and suggested a set of general recommendations in bullet form. This was a transitional period, Chile observed, and the NPT Revcons should be viewed as a continuum with particular emphasis on 1995 and the readiness of the "major players" to balance all three pillars, including both nonproliferation and disarmament. He also noted that the much maligned 2005 Revcon had produced some results on Articles IX and X before its complete breakdown.

¶ 16. (U) Other issues for the Prepcom included electing the Revcon President and officers and procedural matters. Chidyausiku noted that it would be the NAM/Asia Group's turn for the Presidency and Philippines had nominated its Ambassador to the UAE. He also reviewed the revised Draft Program of Work for the Prepcom (emailed to the Department), which was based on the 2004 Prepcom and limited General Debate to three sessions, and procedural issues pertaining to documentation and amending the Rules of Procedure on NGO participation.

¶ 17. (SBU) Concluding his presentation, Chidyausiku cast his role as that of a facilitator who would be guided by states parties. He emphasized to participants that success was "in your hands" and a matter of political will. The priority for the Prepcom was to not get bogged down but rather to "get our act together" in approving an agenda and elements for recommendations that reflected balance among the three NPT pillars. Realizing its experience at the 2005 Revcon, Brazil also noted that the role of the President goes only so far and without the existence of a compromise spirit, all is fruitless.

¶ 18. (SBU) Comment: Chidyausiku came across as sincerely seeking a successful Prepcom with adoption of the Revcon agenda being the measure of its success. He was clearly not inclined to delve into substantive issues to the extent that they could be avoided and deferred to the Revcon. Charge expressed appreciation for the Chair taking account of the new U.S. Administration and underlined strong support for the NPT in all its dimensions.